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Contract as Swag
John F. Coyle* & Joseph M. Green†
ABSTRACT
In the past, legal scholars have analogized the contract to a product,
a social artifact, and a form of technology. In this Article, we suggest that
contracts may also be usefully analogized to swag. The term “swag” refers
to branded merchandise that is given away for free to people who attend
or participate in an event. Companies and law firms increasingly give
away contracts—and specific contract provisions—to contract users with
the goal of enhancing their reputations. In so doing, they deploy their
contracts in a manner that resembles a water bottle or tote bag emblazoned
with the name of a law firm.
There are a number of benefits that flow from conceptualizing
contracts as a form of swag. First, the analogy helps to explain why
lawyers would invest time and energy in developing contract innovations
that are ineligible for formal intellectual property protections. Second, the
analogy provides important insights into how and why some contractual
innovations become widely known in the years after their creation while
others languish in obscurity. Third, and finally, the analogy highlights the
futility in attempting to develop an all-encompassing theory of contractual
innovation.

*Reef C. Ivey II Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
†Senior Legal Editor (Startups & Venture Capital), Thomson Reuters Practical
Law. Thanks to Elisabeth de Fontenay, Carissa Hessick, Andy Hessick, Jeff Hirsch,
Kathleen Thomas, Leigh Osofsky, and Mark Weidemaier for their comments on an earlier
draft of this Article.
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Contract (noun): a binding agreement between two or more persons
or parties.1
Swag (noun): promotional goods or items; goods given to people
who attend or participate in an event.2
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past, some legal scholars have analogized the contract to a
product.3 Others have compared it to a social artifact.4 Still others have
compared it to a form of technology.5 Each of these analogies serves a
distinct purpose. Reimagining the contract as a product makes it easier to
argue that contracts of adhesion should be regulated in the way that other
products are regulated. Analogizing the contract to a social artifact makes
it possible to develop a deeper understanding of why social actors form
particular kinds of contracts and why social systems generate distinctive
1. Contract,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/contract (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
2. Swag,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/swag (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
3. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 74–75 (2008); see also Arthur A. Leff, Contract As Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 147
(1970).
4. See Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 91,
92 (2003).
5. See Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 84 (2013).
This list does not exhaust all of the possible contract analogies. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi
& Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2006) (analogizing
standard-form contracts to statutes); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as
Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (proposing that scholars utilize several
organizational theories as lenses through which to view contracts).
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contract regimes. And conceptualizing the contract as a form of
technology allows researchers to draw upon the existing literature on
technological innovation to explain how and why contract language
evolves over time.
In this Article, we suggest that the contract may also be usefully
analogized to swag. The term “swag” is generally understood to refer to
branded merchandise that is given away for free to people who attend or
participate in an event. A list of examples might include Westlaw handing
out water bottles with its name emblazoned across the side, a law firm
giving its associates umbrellas with the firm’s name on them, or a law
school providing free flash drives decorated with the university’s colors
and seal. Over the past few decades, we argue, certain contracts have
increasingly come to resemble the water bottles, umbrellas, flash drives,
and other tchotchkes that are given away by law firms and other providers
of legal services. These contracts have, in short, become a form of swag.
Consider the Keep It Simple Security (“KISS”). The KISS is a
contract that was developed by a startup incubator—500 Startups—to
facilitate the task of channeling capital from investors to early-stage
technology companies.6 Unlike most contracts, the KISS is not tucked
away on a password-protected hard drive at a law firm.7 It is available for
free download from the 500 Startups website.8 Unlike most contracts, the
KISS does not have a boring, descriptive name (like stock purchase
agreement). It has a distinctive, memorable name that sets it apart from the
mass of other startup financing contracts. The KISS is being given away
by 500 Startups for the express purpose of improving its reputation in the
startup community in much the same way that Westlaw distributes water
bottles with its name on it to improve its brand awareness among lawyers
and law students. Significantly, the KISS is not unique. There are a number
of other examples of contracts—and individual contractual provisions—
being handed out like swag in contemporary practice.9
A number of benefits flow from conceptualizing these contracts as a
form of swag. Among other things, the analogy helps to explain otherwise
inexplicable behavior by lawyer-innovators.10 It has always been the case
that it is difficult, and therefore exceedingly rare, for lawyers to obtain
intellectual property rights in the contractual language that they create.
This fact has, in turn, led some scholars to argue that lawyers lack
meaningful incentives to innovate and disseminate contractual
innovations. “What’s the point of creating a new and original contract
6. John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, The SAFE, the KISS, and the Note: A Survey of
Seed Financing Contracts, 103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 42, 47–48 (2018).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See infra Part II (discussing examples).
10. See infra Section III.A.
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provision,” so the argument goes, “when other firms can simply take that
language and incorporate it into their own agreements?” If a contract is
reimagined as a form of swag, however, it is easy to see why lawyerinnovators might develop new contracts notwithstanding the lack of
intellectual property protection for their creations.11 These contracts can
serve as branding devices that the innovator can use to attract additional
clients to her practice.
The contract-as-swag analogy also highlights a distinction that is
frequently overlooked in the contractual innovation literature. This is the
distinction between the creation of a particular innovation and the
subsequent dissemination of that innovation to the broader community of
contract users.12 Creators develop new contract language to solve specific
problems. Disseminators spread the word about this innovation. The bulk
of the scholarship in this area to date has focused on factors that motivate
the creation of new innovations rather than their dissemination. The swag
analogy serves to remedy this imbalance because it provides insights into
how and why some contractual innovations become widely disseminated
in the months and years after their creation while others languish in
obscurity.
Finally, reimagining the contract as a type of swag illustrates the
futility in attempting to develop an all-encompassing theory of contractual
innovation.13 Over the past two decades, a number of scholars have sought
to develop a general theory of contractual innovation modeled on the cycle

11. See infra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between brand
and reputation). A number of scholars have previously written about how certain deal
structures may be used to develop a brand. See, e.g., 189, 196 (2007); Victor Fleischer,
Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1581, 1600–05 (2006); Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard IPO: Protecting the Priceless
Brand, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 150 (2006); Fleur Johns, Performing Party
Autonomy, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 266 (2008); D. Gordon Smith, The Branding
Effects of Contracts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. ).189, 196 (2007). The notion that firms
might give away contracts in order to develop their brands, by contrast, has attracted
virtually no scholarly attention. [CITE]
12. See infra Section III.B. This omission is difficult to understand. In other scholarly
traditions, the diffusion of innovations is commonly recognized as essential to
understanding the innovation process. See EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF
INNOVATIONS 43–94 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing various research traditions relating to the
diffusion of innovations). In the legal literature, however, the distinction has only rarely
played a role in the discussion of contractual innovations. See Davis, supra note 5, at 88
(“Unlike some previous work in this vein, the analysis emphasizes the importance of both
the generation and the dissemination of innovations.”); see also Kyle Graham, Of
Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its Assimilation of
Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1268–69 (2012) (discussing diffusion of
doctrinal innovations in tort law); Kyle Graham, The Diffusion of Doctrinal Innovations in
Tort Law, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 75, 77 (2015) (same).
13. See infra Section III.C.
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of product development.14 Such models, while useful in many respects,
cannot account for all the relevant factors underlying the successful
introduction of a contractual innovation. In some cases, reputation may
play an important role in driving the creation and dissemination of a
particular innovation. In other cases, reputation may be completely
irrelevant to this inquiry. One final benefit of the contract-as-swag
metaphor, therefore, is that it helps to highlight the idiosyncratic character
of innovation and to illustrate challenges in trying to develop a single, onesize-fits-all model to explain the process of contractual innovation.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the existing legal
literature on contract metaphors and discusses the strengths and
weaknesses of these analogies.15 Part II identifies a number of contracts
from various areas of the law—including venture capital, corporate law,
and arbitration—that bear a strong resemblance to the swag that is so
familiar to lawyers and law students. Part III discusses the advantages of
conceptualizing these contracts as swag. It shows how this analogy
simultaneously explains otherwise inexplicable behavior on the part of
lawyer-innovators, supplements the existing literature on the
dissemination of contractual innovations, and highlights the challenges in
developing a universal model for explaining the process of contractual
innovations.
II.

CONTRACT METAPHORS

In 1970, Arthur Leff famously argued that consumer sales contracts
should no longer be conceptualized as “contracts.”16 Such agreements, in
his view, bore little resemblance to the classic negotiated contract in which
two parties dickered over the terms of their future performance. Instead,
Leff argued that consumer contracts were more properly analogized to
products that were a non-negotiable part of the overall sales transaction.17
Having drawn this analogy, Leff then argued that consumer contracts
should be regulated as products.18 Just as society seeks to protect

14. See Suchman, supra note 4, at 133; see also Stephen Choi et al., The Evolution of
Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 152 (2012); Stephen
Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2013).
15. Technically, an analogy is saying something is like something else whereas a
metaphor is saying something is something else. See Brian Clark, Metaphor, Simile and
Analogy: What’s the Difference, COPYBLOGGER, (May 3, 2007), https://bit.ly/33d2pNc.
This difference notwithstanding, we use the two terms interchangeably throughout the
Article.
16. Leff, supra note 3, at 147.
17. See id.
18. See id.
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consumers from unsafe automobiles, he maintained, so too should it seek
to protect those same consumers from one-sided contracts of adhesion.19
Over the past fifty years, the notion that contracts should be treated
as products has spawned an extensive literature. Scholars have argued that
a wide range of contract types—including but not limited to consumer
contracts, insurance contracts, financial contracts, and contracts concluded
over the internet—should be analogized to products and regulated as
such.20 The decision to characterize a particular type of contract as a
product is generally made with the goal of justifying some sort of
regulation. This strand of the literature is largely uninterested in some of
the other implications that flow from the decision to analogize a contract
to a product.
In 2003, sociologist Mark Suchman explored some of these other
implications.21 Suchman urged scholars to reimagine the contract as a type
of social artifact.22 Such artifacts, he argued, serve many purposes. Joint
venture agreements serve as “blueprints” for a future relationship.23
Punitive liquidated damages clauses and hair-trigger repossession policies,
conversely, can be used to “intimidate” or to “destroy.”24 The mere act of
19. Leff made clear that he was not arguing that “one must view a contract as a thing
in order to regulate its content.” Id. at 150. He maintained, however, that “viewing a
contract as a product facilitates such a strategy, and much more important, makes it
necessary for the draftsman actually to think about what he is trying to do.” Id. Such
protection could be afforded in one of two ways. First, the substantive terms set forth in
contracts of adhesion could be directly regulated by the government. Alternatively, the
government could require contract drafters to include warning labels at the top of such
agreements to highlight some of the risks inherent in signing them. See Ethan J. Leib &
Zev J. Eigen, Consumer Form Contracting in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: The
Unread and the Undead, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 65, 98–101 (2017) (discussing the problems
with transparency as a solution to standard form contracts).
20. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1389 (2007) (insurance contracts); see
also Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV.
975, 983–85 (2005) (internet contracts); Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory
Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 63 (2012) (financial
contracts); Jeffrey W.Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding
Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1135 (2000) (internet contracts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The
Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813, 813 (2009) (insurance
contracts). But see Robert M. Lawless, Response, The Limits of Contract as Product, 157
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 160, 162 (2009), http://bit.ly/2kugBQO (arguing that “consumer
contracts are not like products and suggest that product safety regulation is not the right
frame to approach the many problems that consumer credit contracts do create”).
21. See Suchman, supra note 4, at 92.
22. Suchman defines an artifact as “a discrete material object, consciously produced
or transformed by human activity, under the influence of the physical and/or cultural
environment.” Id. at 98 (emphasis omitted). Utilizing this definition, he argues that
“contract documents clearly qualify as artifacts. They are products of conscious human
effort; they are tangible and discrete physical objects; and, in both form and content, they
reflect a wide array of natural and social influences.” Id.
23. See id. at 107.
24. Id. at 110.
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asking someone to sign a contract can be used “to signify commitment,
seriousness, and finality.”25 Suchman’s core insight was that reimagining
the contract as a social artifact made it possible to develop a deeper
understanding of why particular social actors form particular kinds of
contracts and why social systems generate distinctive contract regimes.
Suchman also urged scholars to look to the existing sociological
literature on technological innovation and diffusion to gain insights into
how contract documents evolve and change over time.26 He identified
specific contractual innovations—including the poison pill—that bore a
close resemblance to other types of technological innovations developed
outside the legal space.27 He cautioned that it was difficult to predict
precisely when a particular innovation would take root.28 Finally, he
observed that “[w]hen efficacy is uncertain and plausible alternatives
abound, even technically superior innovations can vanish under the wheels
of on-rushing bandwagons, unless those innovations manage to secure
strong, visible, and well-connected champions.”29
The notion that contracts constitute a form of technology—and that
the process of contractual innovation is similar to the process of
technological innovation in other fields—was further developed in a
recent article by Kevin Davis.30 In this article, Davis first sought to provide
a general model of the supply and demand for contractual innovations.31
On the supply side, he identified contract users, law firms, specialized
providers of legal documents, non-profit organizations (like trade
associations) and academics as the primary actors who regularly supply
contractual innovations to the legal marketplace.32 On the demand side, he
identified contract users as the actors who demanded contractual
innovations. Davis also noted the differences between the incentives of
for-profit actors (such as law firms) and non-profit actors (such as trade
associations) in generating contractual innovation.33
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, there is no “right” way to
think about a contract. In some situations, it is useful to analogize it to a
product. In others, it is useful to reimagine it as a social artifact. In still
others, it is useful to conceptualize it as a form of technology. Nor are
25. Id. at 113.
26. Id. at 92.
27. Id. at 118–20.
28. Id. at 119.
29. Id. at 117–18 (citing Eric Abrahamson & Lori Rosenkopf, Institutional and
Competitive Bandwagons: Using Mathematical Modeling as a Tool to Explore Innovation
Diffusion, 18 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 487, 487–517 (1993); and then citing Eric Abrahamson
& Lori Rosenkopf, Social Network Effects on the Extent of Innovation Diffusion: A
Computer Simulation, 8 ORG. SCI. 289, 289–309 (1997)).
30. Davis, supra note 5, at 85.
31. Id. at 88.
32. Id. at 112–21.
33. Id. at 116–22.
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these metaphors mutually exclusive. There is no reason why a contract
may not be analogized to both a product and a form of technology. Above
all, the list is not exhaustive. There are other metaphors that have the
potential to provide important insights into contract practice.
III. CONTRACT AS SWAG
The word “swag” was originally understood to be a synonym for
“loot” and was used principally to describe “goods acquired by unlawful
means.”34 Today, the term is generally used to describe merchandise and
promotional items that are given away.35 Swag tends to be inexpensive,
branded items such as t-shirts, tote bags, writing instruments, water
bottles, travel adapters, flash drives and the like.36 Indeed, some maintain
that swag is an acronym for the phrase “stuff we all get.”37 In this Article,
we use the word “swag” to refer to items that are given away gratis for the
purpose of attracting prospective customers, increasing brand awareness,
enhancing reputation, or promoting goodwill.38
Swag has become a fixture of industry conferences and trade shows.39
In these contexts, swag is an investment a company makes to entice
34. See Why Do We Call It ‘Swag’?, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/what-does-swag-mean (last visited
Sept. 22, 2019) (“The freebie swag, sometimes also spelled schwag, dates back to the
1960s and was used to describe promotional items. According to our files, early swag was
everything from promotional records sent to radio stations to free slippers for airline
passengers. In short order, this particular meaning of swag broadened and soon referred to
anything given to an attendee of an event (such as a conference) as a promotional stunt.”).
35. See Our Story, SWAG.COM, https://bit.ly/2kGse7x (last visited Sept. 22, 2019)
(“We’re extremely passionate about good swag. We’ve attended a ridiculous number of
events and received our fair share of promotional products; some good but most bad. A
company purchasing poor swag is not only throwing away their money, as no one will want
it, they’re also smacking their own brand in the face. We know Swag is a champion
marketing tool. Be impactful, strengthen your company culture and communicate your core
values with our superior quality.”).
36. See Elizabeth Segran, It’s Time to Stop Spending Billions on Cheap Conference
Swag, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 2, 2018), https://bit.ly/2PzTEsV. Not all swag is inexpensive.
A so-called “swag bag” from the Oscars has been valued at over $100,000. See Alice G.
Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295, 317–19 (2011)
(discussing taxation of swag bags); see also Anosheh Azarmsa, Award Shows, Gifts, and
Taxes: A Criticism of the Tax Treatment of Celebrity Gift Bags, 28 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
27, 28–29 (2007) (same).
37. See The Office: The Convention (NBC television broadcast Sept. 28, 2006) (in
which Michael Scott, Regional Manager of the Dunder Mifflin Paper Company’s Scranton
branch, uses the word “swag” as an acronym for “stuff we all get” and observes that he
“basically decorated [his] condo for free with all of [his] swag!”); see also Swag, URB.
DICTIONARY, https://bit.ly/2GE6uOs (last visited Sept. 22, 2019) (defining the acronym to
mean “Stuff We All Get,” such as t-shirts, coffee mugs, bumper stickers from vendors at a
trade show).
38. Swag is a big business. See ANNA MILLER, PROMOTIONAL PRODUCTS INDUSTRY IN
THE US – MARKET RESEARCH REPORT NO. 54189 (2019), https://bit.ly/2NIRVPd
(“Producing promotional products is a $18 billion-dollar industry in the U.S.”).
39. See Segran, supra note 36.
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prospective customers to engage with them about their products with the
end goal of converting them into paying customers.40 While the goal of
handing out swag is to make sales, it is not typically an immediate quid
pro quo transaction. No company offers swag with the expectation that the
mere act of doing so will convince a customer to buy their product or
service. The hope is that offering the swag will make a prospective
customer more open to a sales approach at the time the swag is given or in
the future. Swag can create a positive association with a brand in the mind
of the recipient. It can also generally increase brand awareness by creating
hundreds or thousands of walking billboards toting a company’s logo
around with them at the event where the swag is distributed and out in the
world-at-large.
Law firms are prolific distributors of swag. Since few law firms have
brands as recognizable as Coke or Pepsi, traditional swag can help law
firms increase name recognition and differentiate their brands from the
host of similar service providers competing for prospective clients’
attention.41 In the legal industry, however, it is reputation far more than
mere brand awareness that drives most of a firm’s economics. This is
because so many of a law firm’s clients come by word-of-mouth and
through referrals.42 This focus on building and maintaining the firm’s
40. See Jae Um, Inspire. Legal Case Study: Building a New Frame of Reference for
the Ecosystem Era, LEGAL EVOLUTION (Feb. 17, 2019), https://bit.ly/2mbog79
(“Conferences, like most commercial endeavors, are exchanges of value for value. They
work by offering distinct value propositions to three primary participating groups.
Attendees usually pay for learning and networking; their employers often subsidize this
expense to complement internal training. Sponsors pay for access to attendees as defined
market segments as a means to drive sales (and usually invest in swag and booth
experiences to lure those attendees to the expo hall). Speakers spend time and effort to
provide content in exchange for professional credentialing and personal brand lift.”).
41. Law firms have increasingly been devoting attention to their brands, as evidenced
by the many firms that have chopped the number of name partners down to one or two to
create a more memorable brand. See, e.g., Micah U. Buchdahl, Branding Is the Heart of
Your Marketing Message, LAW PRAC. MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2013, at 60, 61–62, available at
http://bit.ly/2m6MHTm (“In recent years, law firm merger mania has led to changes in
long-recognized law firm names. . . . This type of rebranding is part of the law firm
marketing fabric today.”); Gregg Wirth, Branding Growing More Important in HyperCompetitive Legal Space, New Acritas Surveys Show, LEGAL EXECUTIVE INST. (Oct. 22,
2018), https://bit.ly/2m0R3uQ (“Branding — the cementing of an image of quality,
specialization and price point into the minds of clients — is becoming of the utmost
importance in today’s heavily crowded and hyper-competitive legal marketplace.”).
42. Reputation and brand awareness are distinct, but related concepts. See Richard
Ettenson & Jonathan Knowles, Don’t Confuse Reputation With Brand, MIT SLOAN MGMT.
REV.., Winter 2008, at 19, available athttps://bit.ly/2tXmoTr. A “brand” is a
“‘customercentric’ concept that focuses on what a product, service, or company has
promised to its customers and what that commitment means to them.” Id. “A strong brand
helps communicate that the company and its offerings are relevant and uniquely able to
meet customer needs.” Id. Reputation, by comparison, is a “‘companycentric’ concept that
focuses on the credibility and respect that an organization has among a broad set of
constituencies, including employees, investors, regulators, journalists, and local
communities . . . .” Id.
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reputation is why law firm websites trumpet the credentials of their
lawyers—Law Review! Supreme Court clerkship! Super Lawyer!—when
many companies in other industries decline to publish lists of their
employees. When it comes to external relations, therefore, many firms are
engaged in a two-pronged strategy: (1) they distribute swag—in the form
of umbrellas, tote bags, and flash drives—to improve brand awareness;
and (2) they trumpet the credentials of the lawyers and the prestige of their
clients in order to enhance their reputations.
Over the past few decades, we argue, some enterprising lawyers have
sought to combine these two strategies. These lawyers have developed
new contract language—thereby enhancing their reputation as forwardthinking innovators—and then freely distributed that language to the
world as a means of improving their firms’ (as well as their own) brand.
They have, in other words, started treating contract language as a
distinctive form of swag. Significantly, this type of swag is a far cry from
the cheap tchotchkes that we have described thus far. The contract as swag
is more of a sneak peek or preview of the cutting-edge, high-quality work
product that a particular lawyer, firm, or organization can offer its
prospective customers; should they choose to give them their business.
While not all contracts or contractual innovations qualify as swag,
there are more than enough examples of such behavior to constitute a
distinct phenomenon. In this Part, we identify some of the more prominent
examples where contracts or contract language operate, in effect, as swag
dispensed by a range of legal service providers.
A.

Seed Financing Contracts

In 2013, the partners at Y Combinator, the premier startup accelerator
in Silicon Valley, published a new contract on the company website.43 This
contract—the Simple Agreement for Future Equity (“SAFE”)—was
created with the goal of supplanting a different type of contract (the
convertible note) as a means of channeling capital from investors to earlystage technology companies.44 Viewed from the perspective of the
entrepreneur, the convertible note was an imperfect means of raising
capital for two reasons. First, it had a maturity date, which provided
43. See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture
Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 133, 168 (2014) [hereinafter Contractual Innovation]; see also
John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 288 n.15 (2013)
(describing the role played by Y Combinator within the start-up ecosystem of Silicon
Valley).
44. See Contractual Innovation, supra note 43, at 168–69. The choice of name was
both a clever piece of branding and an accurate descriptor. The SAFE is, in effect, a
deferred equity investment. The investor contributes capital now in the hope that the startup
will someday raise funds from an institutional venture capitalist, in which case his SAFE
will convert into the same security purchased by this venture capitalist at a discount. In this
respect, the SAFE truly was a simple agreement for future equity.Id. at 168–70.
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considerable leverage to investors to extract concessions from the startup
if, as was usually the case, the debt could not be paid when it came due
because the company had already spent all the funds.45 Second, the notes
(being debt instruments) accrued interest, which was viewed as an
unnecessary giveaway to investors, who were already receiving a risk
premium through a conversion discount.46 The SAFE sought to address
each of these problems, first, by eliminating the maturity date and, second,
by dropping the requirement that the notes accrue interest.47 The resulting
agreement was widely perceived as an exceptionally “founder-friendly”
document that could be used to raise capital from potential investors.48
The SAFE was developed by Carolynn Levy, a Y Combinator partner
who had previously worked as an attorney at the Silicon Valley law firm
of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.49 In the months after the SAFE was
posted, Levy systematically spread the word of her invention. She gave
interviews to print media and bloggers, traveled to academic conferences,
and reached out to investors and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley and
beyond to promote her creation.50 These outreach efforts soon bore fruit.
A recent survey of startup lawyers in the United States showed that 91%
of respondents had heard of the SAFE.51 That same survey found that 69%
of these same lawyers had represented a client in a deal involving a
SAFE.52
In many respects, the process by which the SAFE was introduced
to the world resembled nothing so much as a traditional product launch.
There was, however, one key difference—the SAFE was being given away
for free. Any investor, entrepreneur, or startup lawyer could download it
from Y Combinator’s website, which presented something of a puzzle.
Why would Y Combinator go to all the time and trouble to develop and
distribute this contract when there was no reasonable prospect of obtaining
a return on its investment? The solution to this puzzle, we argue, lies in
recognizing the SAFE as a form of swag. Y Combinator’s motivations in

45. See id. at 165–66.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 169.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 168.
50. See id. at 170; see alsoat 170; see also Zach Abramowitz, Innovation More Than
Another App: How Wilson Sonsini Lawyer Turned YC Partner Carolynn Levy Is
Revolutionizing Startup Investing, ABOVE LAW (Jan. 20, 2015, 4:02 PM),
https://bit.ly/2HBta28; Michael Carney, Y Combinator introduces safe, a new early stage
funding structure. Promises all the good of convertible notes, none of the bad, PANDO (Dec.
6, 2013), https://bit.ly/2lKUzd0; Adam Janofsky & Angus Loten, Startups Offer Unusual
Reward for Investing, WALL ST. J.,. (Apr. 1, 2015, 11:08 PM),
https://on.wsj.com/2tV1UL1P.M.),.
51. See Coyle & Green, supra note 6, at 51.
52. See id. at 54.
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giving this contract away were not altruistic. Instead, it gave the SAFE
away in order to brand itself as a strong advocate for founders.
The advantages of such an endeavor were quickly recognized by
other startup accelerators. About nine months after Y Combinator
introduced the SAFE, a different accelerator—500 Startups—made its
own startup-financing contract publicly available. This contract—the
Keep It Simple Security (“KISS”)—bore a strong resemblance to the
SAFE but it had a different name and was downloadable from the 500
Startups website. In a blog post introducing the KISS, the general counsel
of 500 Startups described this new contract in terms (and in a font) usually
associated with the launch of a new product line:
The KISS docs are designed to SAVE founders & investors TIME and
MONEY. They’re FREE legal docs you can use to RAISE MONEY quickly
& easily, hopefully WITHOUT GETTING SCREWED.53
The general counsel also sought to differentiate the KISS from the SAFE
by arguing that the KISS did a better job of striking a “balance between
the interests of the founders as well as those of the investors.”54
Again, one could be forgiven for wondering why 500 Startups went
to the trouble. Why does it care whether investors and entrepreneurs were
using the KISS as opposed to the SAFE? There are two explanations. First,
500 Startups was seeking to attract additional entrepreneurs to its
accelerator program and it believed that its odds of success were greater if
potential applications had already used its branded contract documents to
raise money for their startup.55 Second, it was mimicking a successful
innovation by a better-known competitor in the hopes of generating
favorable comparisons with that competitor. In this regard, its strategy
appears to have paid modest dividends. A survey of U.S. startup lawyers
conducted in 2018 found that 66% of these individuals had heard of the
KISS and that 26% of them had represented a client in a deal involving a
KISS.56 While these numbers are less impressive than the numbers
generated by the SAFE, they show that knowledge of this particular

53. Gregory Raiten, 500 Startups Announces ‘KISS’, 500 STARTUPS (July 3, 2014),
https://500.co/kiss/.
54. Id. This is debatable. In a subsequent post to the 500 Startups website, a different
author acknowledged the many similarities between the KISS and the SAFE. See Adam
Sterling, KISSs and SAFEs and Notes. . ..oh my!, 500 STARTUPS (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://500.co/kisss-safes-andnotes-oh/.
55. Raiten, supra note 53 (“We’ve put in a lot of work to make KISS docs one of the
best convertible instruments on the market, and we encourage companies seeking an
investment from 500 to use KISS docs. . . . In fact, we’d love to see KISS docs adopted by
other investors, thereby reducing legal costs for everyone and eliminating some of the
friction involved in closing a round of financing.”).
56. See Coyle & Green, supra note 6, at 51.

2020

CONTRACT AS SWAG

365

contractual innovation has also spread widely in the years since it first
debuted.
There are other examples of seed financing contracts being used as
swag. Before Y Combinator created the SAFE and 500 Startups created
the KISS, a partner at Wilson Sonsini in Silicon Valley (and the founder
of yet another accelerator) created a similar instrument that was publicized
and made freely available.57 This instrument—dubbed the Convertible
Security—lacked a flashy name and marketing heft and never gained
much traction in the marketplace. Another Silicon Valley law firm,
Fenwick & West, has created a stripped-down set of venture financing
documents that it branded the “Series Seed” forms and made publicly
available on a standalone website.58 It later open-sourced the forms on
GitHub, a major forum for software developers to store and share opensource code.59 Cooley, Goodwin Procter, and a host of other startupfocused law firms have publicly provided (at no charge) a wide variety of
their startup formation and financing forms through branded self-service
portals that incorporate document automation technology.60
The swag phenomenon can even be observed in some of the most
cutting-edge areas of startup law, areas where one might expect that firms
would attempt to reserve their innovations for paying clients only. For
example, in 2017, Cooley in collaboration with blockchain company
Protocol Labs released a white paper promoting the “SAFT” (Simple
Agreement for Future Tokens), a modified version on Y Combinator’s
SAFE for blockchain startups to use when conducting initial coin offerings
(“ICOs”).61 More recently, Latham & Watkins worked with blockchain
incubator Consensys and its portfolio company OpenLaw to automate a
convertible note designed to be used by blockchain startups that may issue
digital tokens via smart contracts in connection with capital raising.62 This
automated convertible note, which Latham & Watkins made freely
available, was originally based on 500 Startups’ KISS documents. These
examples are merely the tip of the iceberg when it comes to law firms in
the startup space developing innovative contracts, branding them, and
giving them away to the startup community-at-large, for free. In many of

57. See Contractual Innovation, supra note 43, at 166–67.
58. See id. at 175–76.
59. See Press Release, Fenwick & West LLP, Series Seed Funding Documents Go
Open Source @ GitHub (Mar. 6, 2013), https://bit.ly/2kIuICe.
60. See, e.g., COOLEYGO, http://www.cooleygo.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2019)
(Cooley LLP); FOUNDERS WORKBENCH, http://www.foundersworkbench.com (last visited
Sept. 22, 2019) (Goodwin Proctor LLP).
61. See Pete Rizzo, SAFT Arrives: ‘Simple’ Investor Agreement Aims to Remove ICO
Complexities, COINDESK (Oct. 3, 2017, 11:17 A.M.), https://bit.ly/2lPOOuu.
62. See Consensys And Latham & Watkins Announce a Convertible Note Generator
for Startups Powered by OpenLaw, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (May 10, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2kB3Eoy.
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these cases, we argue, these innovative contracts bear a strong
resemblance to swag.
B.

The Poison Pill

While the venture capital contracts discussed in the preceding Section
constitute modern examples of contract as swag, the analogy can also be
extended to legal devices created decades ago. One of the best—and bestknown—examples is the poison pill.63 The pill was invented by Martin
Lipton, an attorney at the firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.64 The
first version of the pill was deployed in late 1982 in an attempt to help the
El Paso Company fend off an unwanted suitor.65 In reviewing the
company’s organizational documents in search of possible defensive
measures, Lipton discovered that these documents gave the board the
power to issue preferred stock without first obtaining the consent of the
stockholders.66 Lipton subsequently took this otherwise unremarkable
provision and developed it into a potent anti-takeover device.
On Lipton’s advice, the El Paso Company issued shares of preferred
stock containing special redemption and conversion rights that would be
triggered when—and only when—the acquirer acquired a specified
percentage of the target company’s stock.67 The redemption rights would
force the acquirer to redeem the stock of all of the stockholders in the target
at a price equal to the highest price paid for the stock over the past year.68
The conversion rights would require the acquirer to convert the stock of
the shareholder in the target company into twice as much stock in the
acquiring company.69 The mere possibility of either of these
eventualities—each of which would inflict massive costs upon the
acquiring company—was intended to deter anyone from attempting a
hostile takeover in the first place or, alternatively, to force them to
63. The poison pill is not a technically a contact. See Suchman, supra note 4, at 119
n.83 (observing that poison pills “fall at the intersection between contract, property, and
securities law”). A company’s decision to issue a new security to its existing shareholders
giving them the right to purchase company stock, however, arguably creates a contract-like
relationship between the company and the shareholders. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 953 (7th ed. 2008) (describing a poison pill whereby
“the target distributes by a dividend to its shareholders warrants or ‘rights’ that entitle all
of them (other than the bidder or its affiliates) to purchase the target’s stock for a specified
period”). As such, we believe that poison pills are sufficiently close cousins of the standard
contract to warrant discussion here. [CITE]
64. See Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private
Lawmaking, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 423, 434 (1993).
65. See Len Costa, The Perfect Pill – A small innovation that transformed corporate
takeovers, LEGAL AFF. (Mar.–Apr. 2005), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April2005/toa_costa_marapr05.msp.
66. See id.
67. Powell, supra note 64, at 434–45.
68. See id. at 435.
69. Id.
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negotiate with the board in order to “redeem” the pill and take it off the
table as a takeover defense.70
Word of this new defensive measure quickly spread throughout the
legal community. The term “poison pill” was coined in 1983 by Martin
Siegel, an investment banker who worked closely with Wachtell.71 At least
at first, however, no other firms advised their clients to adopt the pill.72
Every company that adopted a poison pill in 1983 and 1984 was a client
of Wachtell.73 Other law firms, by and large, viewed the pill as a novel
defense that ran a serious risk of being struck down by the Delaware
courts. Only Wachtell, the firm that had invented the pill, was willing to
stake its reputation on its success. As George Triantis has written:
Wachtell Lipton knew that their potential clients might hesitate to pay
for the pill because of the uncertainty about the new product, and
particularly the risk that it might be unenforceable and therefore
ineffective when needed in the face of a hostile takeover bid. As such,
an important part of the Wachtell strategy was to absorb much of the
back-end risk: it essentially guaranteed that the firm would take all
steps to ensure that the pill would not be struck down by the courts.
The firm used a broad public relations strategy to explain why the pill
was in the public interest and they defended against the early legal
challenges to the pill.74

This public relations strategy was spearheaded by Lipton. He promoted
the poison pill in client memoranda.75 He sat for interviews in which he
extolled the virtues of the pill.76 He encouraged a former summer associate
at Wachtell to publish a student note in the Harvard Law Review defending

70. Id.
71. See Costa, supra note 65. Siegel was the first investment banker to throw his
support behind the poison pill as a defensive measure. Id.
72. Powell, supra note 64, at 436.
73. Id. at 435–36.
74. George Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology, and
Innovation in Contract Design, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 177, 199–200 (2013).
75. See Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037,
1037 (2002) (noting “the twentieth anniversary of the publication of my memorandum
recommending that companies adopt the poison pill, which I invented in the summer of
1982”); see also Memorandum from Martin Lipton, to Clients, Share Purchase Rights
Plans (“Poison Pills”) (Nov. 21, 1985) (on file with Penn Law School), available at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7876-culled-martin-lipton-publicationspdf
(“Takeover entrepreneurs and speculators hate Rights Plans and are continuing their
campaign to outlaw them. . . . While Rights Plans do not prevent all take overs they do
protect against abusive takeover tactics and they do deter bust-up bootstrap two-tier junk
bond takeovers. Naturally those who profit from these takeovers at the expense of
American business workers and communities and whose wildly speculative activities
threaten our entire economic system oppose anything that restricts their activities. There is
no stronger argument for implementing a Rights Plan now.”).
76. See, e.g., Chase deKay Wilson, Marty Lipton’s Poison Pill, 3 INT’L FIN. L. REV.
10, 10 (1984).
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the pill.77 He gave speeches encouraging companies to adopt it. At the
same time, Wachtell made a number of revisions to the pill. Subsequent
iterations of the pill, for example, were structured as dividends to
shareholders rather than preferred stock.78 This dividend took the form of
a warrant to purchase one share of the target company at a price well above
its prevailing market price.79 Attached to this warrant, however, was a
“flip-over” provision that granted shareholders the right to purchase shares
in any acquirer at half-price if the company was acquired.80 This latter
provision would—the firm hoped—prove to be sufficiently poisonous so
as to deter potential acquirers.
Wachtell implemented these changes, among other reasons, because
it felt that this new-and-improved pill was more likely to survive a legal
challenge. The anticipated legal challenge arrived in 1984, when a
shareholder brought a suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery against
Household International (a Wachtell client) challenging the validity of a
pill adopted by the company’s board. At trial, the company prevailed in
the Court of Chancery.81 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court
specifically concluded that the board’s decision to adopt the pill was a
proper exercise of its discretion under the business judgment rule. 82 While
there were a number of subsequent decisions in which the Delaware courts
questioned the propriety of deploying the poison pill in a particular
context, its underlying validity has never been challenged.
Once the Delaware courts formally gave their blessing to the pill, a
host of other law firms began to develop their own versions. As Michael
J. Powell wrote:
Before the Delaware Supreme Court's affirmative decision, Wachtell
Lipton was the only law firm dispensing the pills. Afterward, other
firms, including Skadden Arps, which had strongly opposed the pill
from the beginning, rushed to join Wachtell Lipton as dispensers, now
recommending its adoption to their clients. These new proponents
engaged in further modifications of the poison pill as they promulgated
their own variations on the basic Wachtell Lipton design in order to
present their clients with a distinctive and, they argued, more potent
product. As a consequence, several additional varieties of the poison

77. See David Margolick, Law Review is Caught in Corporate Crossfire, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 1984,), https://nyti.ms/360dimT (noting complaints by partner at Skadden Arps
that the student’s link to Wachtell was not mentioned in the article, that Wachtell was given
the opportunity to review the article prior to publication, and that Lipton had sent copies
of the article to his clients after it was published).
78. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 63, at 951–54.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A. 2d 1059, 1082–83 (Del. Ch. 1985),
aff’d, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
82. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356–57 (Del. 1985).
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pill soon appeared in the marketplace, each hawked by different law
firms extolling the virtues of their particular model.83

By the time these other law firms got into the game, however, the poison
pill had become synonymous with Wachtell and Lipton, and they with it.
There was no realistic way to keep the language that implemented the
pill a secret. All the companies adopting it were all publicly traded and
hence required to disclose the terms of any new securities or dividends
issued to shareholders. Nor did Wachtell and Lipton try to keep it a secret.
Indeed, they actively encouraged current and potential clients to adopt the
pill and were happy to provide the language to anyone who asked for it.84
If they could not copyright or patent this particular contractual innovation
(and they probably could not, for reasons discussed below) the least they
could do was use it to generate goodwill for their respective brands. In this
regard, they were immensely successful. There exist hundreds of
newspaper profiles of Lipton that mention the fact that he “invented” the
poison pill.85 Even today, almost 40 years after the pill was first deployed,
Wachtell’s firm website proudly notes that it “originated the shareholder
rights plan, or ‘poison pill.’”86 Wachtell and Lipton have continued to reap
the reputational benefits (and concomitant pecuniary benefits) from this
particular innovation for decades.
Here again, therefore, we have a lawyer-entrepreneur who develops
new contract language. That individual actively works to distribute that
language as part of a branding exercise intended to cultivate goodwill
among a specified group of individuals and firms.87 Companies learn of
83. Powell, supra note 64, at 440–41 (emphasis added).
84. ROGERS, supra note 12, at 177 (“Change agents often seek to speed up the
innovation-decision process for innovation-decision process for individuals by sponsoring
demonstrations of a new idea in a social system. A demonstration can be quite effective at
speeding up the diffusion process, especially if the demonstrator is a diffusion leader.”).
85. See Costa, supra note 65 (observing that the “poison pill quickly transformed
takeover law and fortified the reputation of its creator and staunchest defender, Martin
Lipton—co-founder of the New York City law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.”);
see also Andrew Tutt, A Fragment on Legal Innovation, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 1001, 1021
(2014) (“It was not just the fact of the innovation, but the ingenuity and enthusiasm of its
diffusion [by Lipton] that made the poison pill a legal innovation we still know and
remember.”); Adverse Reaction: Professors find fatal flaws in a body of work on takeovers
and corporate governance, N.Y.U. L., https://bit.ly/2kRylpk (last updated June 17, 2016)
(“Also known as shareholder rights plans, poison pills, it so happens, were the brainchild
of one of NYU Law’s most illustrious graduates: Martin Lipton ‘55, co-founder of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, a firm that has made its reputation in part by defending
companies against hostile takeovers.”).
86. Corporate Practice, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, https://bit.ly/2lUxKDE
(last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
87. Powell, supra note 64, at 448 (“[L]aw firms did not passively wait for clients to
ask them for prescriptions for a poison pill but proactively marketed their particular brand
through client memoranda and presentations to boards of directors. Law firms acted as
legal entrepreneurs with new products to develop and market. They competed with each
other over what exactly constituted the best legal product.”).
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this language and choose to incorporate it into their documents. Thereafter,
they have a better opinion of the innovator and are presumably more likely
to use the services provided by that innovator in the future. Viewed
through this lens, the poison pill—like the seed financing contracts
discussed above—may be usefully conceptualized as a form of swag.
C.

The Class Arbitration Waiver

Still another contractual innovation that may be usefully analogized
to swag is the class arbitration waiver. This contract provision stipulates
that (1) all disputes must be resolved by arbitration, and (2) no class
actions shall be permitted in arbitration. By requiring consumers to
arbitrate small claims that are not economically viable outside of a class
action, the class arbitration waiver helps to ensure that many individual
claims for relatively low amounts of money are never brought in the first
place.88
To learn about the origins of this particular innovation, we contacted
the person frequently credited with creating it—Alan Kaplinsky, a partner
at Ballard Spahr LLP in Philadelphia.89 The genesis for this particular
innovation, Kaplinsky told us, was a desire to reduce the number of class
action lawsuits brought against his clients in the financial services
industry.90 In his words:
In the 1990s, my clients were getting just overwhelmed with litigation
in Alabama. This was before tort reform. It was a period of time where
the courts in Alabama were considered to be a judicial hellhole in the
country and things were really out of control. My clients were being
sued in scores—hundreds—of individual and class action lawsuits.
They would go down there and get stuck in state court. Every case
would either settle or go to trial because you couldn’t ever get a court
to grant a dispositive motion. My clients asked whether anything could
be done to level the playing field. That’s when I started looking into
arbitration.91

Kaplinsky soon ascertained that the use of arbitration provisions had the
potential to reduce the number of individual lawsuits. He knew, however,
88. Myriam Giles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake
of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 631 (2012) (“[C]lass action
waivers embedded in arbitration provisions, if not constrained by legal challenges, would
threaten the viability of most forms of aggregate litigation.”).
89. Joseph N. DiStefano, Ballard’s Alan Kaplinsky: 48 years helping banks fight
consumer advocates, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 21, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2kFu4Wg
(“Kaplinsky takes credit for the Arbitration Waiver, an agreement that forces bank
customers (and, more recently, corporate employees) to accept arbitration to settle disputes,
instead of suing or joining well-financed class-action lawsuits.”).
90. Telephone Interview with Alan Kaplinsky, Partner, Ballard Spahr LLP (June 4,
2018) [hereinafter Kaplinksy Interview].
91. Id.
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that his company’s clients did not want to arbitrate class action suits.92
Since there was no case law addressing the question of whether class
arbitration waivers were enforceable, Kaplinsky had no way of knowing
whether the courts would enforce these provisions.93 He was also aware
that adding such waivers to consumer contracts in the financial services
industry had the potential to generate a serious backlash among consumer
advocates. At the same time, he felt that his clients had little to lose.94 As
he explained it:
The potential downside with adding express class action waivers is that
we’re rubbing up against an issue that is not going to resonate well
with a lot of courts around the country—state courts and jurisdictions
where the judiciary is very liberal. Put in that kind of language and it’s
like putting a red cape in front of a bull. It’s going to attract a lot of
attention and political attention. Plaintiffs’ attorneys and consumer
advocates are going to go ballistic. We weighed all that and had
discussions with our clients and our clients went along and said that
they wanted very express language and were willing to take the heat in
some jurisdictions and it would benefit them where the arbitration class
action waiver would be enforced.95

The first express class arbitration waiver was written into a consumer
financial services contract in 1998.96 In the years that followed, similar
92. To guard against this possibility, Kaplinksy advised clients to include “blow up”
language in the clause which provided that “if a court concludes that the class action waiver
is invalid and that becomes a final judgment, then the entire arbitration clause will blow up
and won’t exist at all.” Id.
93. Id. (“What I found back then was that there was no such thing as a class action
waiver and most of the law that I was able to find were cases when it’s appropriate to
consolidate two or more arbitrations that may be pending. A lot of law on that subject was
to the effect that unless your arbitration provision specifically authorized the consolidation
of your arbitration with one or more other arbitrations then the court couldn’t order the
arbitrations to be consolidated. This was the law just about everywhere but no law dealing
with class actions and how would that apply in the class action context.”).
94. Id. (“So basically I said to my clients: ‘You don’t have a lot to lose. You’re getting
killed right now because of litigation. I can’t assure you that this is going to work
everywhere but it could work in a few places but the worst-case scenario is you end up
right where you are now.’”); see also Robert K. Heady, Credit Card Companies May
Change Game At Will, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 1998, at A1 (citing
Kaplinksy regarding credit card arbitration clauses).
95. Kaplinksy Interview, supra note 90.
96. See id.; see also In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., No. 03-CV-9592(GBD), 2006
11742WL 662341, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006) (noting that American Express first
introduced the class arbitration waiver in 1999). Prior to the introduction of the “express”
class arbitration waiver, a number of courts and commentators had considered the
possibility that a “silent” arbitration clause—one that mandated arbitration but that did not
expressly disclaim the right to bring a class action—functioned as a de facto waiver of
one’s right to bring a class action. See, e.g., Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration
Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 141, 141 (1997) (discussing use of
arbitration clauses to avoid class actions); Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me,
But Who’s the Predator? Banks Can Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, A.B.A..: BUS.
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clauses found their way into other agreements. The precise process by
which this occurred—recounted in exhaustive detail in a 2014 antitrust
case—offers fascinating insights into the process by which this particular
innovation diffused across the industry and the nation.97
In the spring of 1999, a group of lawyers representing financial
services companies proposed an industry-wide meeting to discuss the
possibility of writing class arbitration waivers into their consumer
contracts. Kaplinsky—described as a “thought leader” on this issue—
participated in this meeting and helped to identify “businesses that might
want to join a coalition to defend and foster arbitration.”98 Representatives
of seven banks—along with representatives from Sears, Toyota, and GE
Capital, among others—ultimately attended a meeting held in July 1999 at
which they discussed how to draft “fair, enforceable arbitration
provisions.”99 Additional meetings followed. In September 1999,
Discover officially added a class arbitration waiver to its agreements with
its cardholders.100 In February 2000, Bank of American followed suit.101
Meanwhile, a group of financial services lawyers and in-house
counsel—including Kaplinsky—were meeting regularly to discuss public
relations, litigation strategy, and drafting tips as they related to class
arbitration waivers.102 By September 2000, several additional companies
(including Sears) decided to add a class arbitration clause to their
consumer contracts.103 After a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases
endorsing the use of such clauses, many more companies followed suit.104
Class arbitration waiver clauses can now be found in a wide range of
consumer contracts, including those with cable companies, mobile phone
companies, and companies that sell goods online.105

L. TODAY, May–June 1998, at 24 (discussing use of silent arbitration clause to avoid class
actions brought against financial services firms); J.T. Westermeir, How Arbitration
Clauses Can Help Avoid Class Action Damages: Strategies for Managing Risks of
Litigation, COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST, no. 5, Sept. 1997, at 1 (discussing use of silent
arbitration clauses to avoid class actions brought against firms selling goods online). To
date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the question of whether a “silent”
arbitration clause operates as a class arbitration waiver; all of its decisions have dealt with
clauses that contained “express” class arbitration waivers.
97. See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
98. Id. at 416.
99. Id. at 417.
100. See id. at 418.
101. See id. at 421.
102. See id. at 423.
103. See id.
104. See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration
Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV.
955, 961 (2014).
105. See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 414–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(providing a comprehensive history of the process by which the class arbitration waiver
came to be adopted by credit card companies).
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Throughout this process, Kaplinsky actively encouraged companies
to adopt the class arbitration waiver that he helped create. He personally
represented American Express, Capital One, Citi, and Discover and gave
his contract language to these companies to assist them in developing their
clauses.106 He advocated for class arbitration waivers at trade association
meetings, engaged in debates with other attorneys, wrote articles for
industry newsletters, and discussed them with members of the American
Bar Association’s subcommittee on financial services.107 Although
Kaplinsky was clearly motivated by a desire to represent his clients to the
best of his ability, his subsequent actions to take credit for inventing the
class arbitration waiver suggest that he was also motivated—at least in
part—by a desire to enhance his reputation in the legal community.
The widespread diffusion of this particular innovation has brought a
measure of fame—though not necessarily fortune—to Alan Kaplinsky. It
is common to read press reports that describe him as the inventor of the
class arbitration waiver. His Wikipedia page notes that he was “the first
lawyer in the country to include class action waiver language in consumer
arbitration clauses that require consumers to individually arbitrate any
dispute.”108 His firm’s website trumpets the fact that it “pioneered” the use
of class arbitration waivers in consumer financial services agreements.109
To the extent that Kaplinsky was motivated by a desire for reputational
benefit, he has been successful in achieving this end.
Kaplinsky has not, however, derived any direct financial benefit from
this innovation separate and apart from his hourly billing rate.110 As he put
it: “I only wish I had told my clients that they would have had to pay me
not by the hour but by how much I’ve saved them over the years. It’s too
bad I couldn’t copyright it.”111 Ironically, this particular innovation may
have been a net loser for Ballard Spahr, the firm where Kaplinsky has
worked for decades.112 By rendering it uneconomical for plaintiffs to bring
claims against financial services firms, the class action waiver makes it
unnecessary for these companies to hire litigators who work at firms such
as Ballard Spahr to defend them. While Kaplinsky has personally
benefited reputationally from developing the class arbitration waiver, and

106. See id. at 430.
107. See Kaplinsky Interview, supra note 90.
108. Alan Kaplinsky, WIKIPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2khV2D3 (last updated . 23Oct. 18,
2019, 6:AM44 PM).
109. See Alan S. Kaplinsky et al., Supreme Court Hands Employers “Epic” Win in
Class Action Waivers Dispute, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (May 22, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2kMFtTV.
110. Kaplinsky Interview, supra note 90.
111. Id.
112. Id. (“This was actually contrary to the economic interests of our firm—or any
defense lawyers—because part of our business is to defend clients who get sued in class
action litigation.”).

374

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 124:2

while Ballard Spahr has benefited from its association with the innovation,
one cannot help but wonder if the costs of developing and disseminating
this particular piece of swag may have outweighed the benefits to the
corporate defense bar as a whole.
IV. SWAG AND CONTRACTUAL INNOVATION
The insight that flows from the examples discussed above is
straightforward—new and innovative contract language is sometimes
developed and disseminated with the express goal of enhancing the brand
and the reputation of the creator. In this Part, we explore some of the
implications of this insight for the contractual innovation literature more
broadly. We argue first that the potential for reputational gains can help to
explain why lawyers innovate in the first place. The existing literature on
contractual innovation is replete with reasons why potential innovators
may choose not to develop new contract language. These disincentives
include the fact that it is difficult to obtain intellectual property protections
for contract language. We argue that the possibility of becoming known as
the inventor or creator of a widely adopted innovation can serve as a
counterweight to these other disincentives even when there are no formal
legal protections for these innovations.
Next, we argue that conceptualizing contracts as swag shines a
spotlight on a distinction that has received little attention by legal scholars
who write about contractual innovation (i.e., the difference between the
factors that lead to the creation of an innovation and the factors that lead
to the dissemination of that same innovation). The bulk of the scholarship
in this area to date has focused on factors that motivate the creation of new
innovations rather than their dissemination. The swag analogy serves to
balance the scales because it provides insights into how and why some
contractual innovations become widely known in the months and years
after the moment of their creation while others never catch on. To the
extent that some lawyers are incentivized to disseminate contractual
innovations out of a desire to burnish their reputations, these incentives
can also help to explain why these innovations spread.
Finally, we rely on the contract-as-swag analogy to highlight the
challenges in developing a one-size-fits-all theory of contract innovation.
We acknowledge that the swag analogy does not provide a complete
explanation for the process of contractual innovation and dissemination.
Rather, it merely provides an explanation for a subset of contracts. Other
scholars, however, have advanced broader theories that aspire to provide
a unified field theory of all contractual innovation. We argue that it is
impossible to develop a comprehensive theory in this area due to the
enormous number of variables that can impact whether or not a contractual
innovation catches on. While it is easy to be seduced by a big idea, one
must also be cautious not to ignore the many idiosyncratic factors that can
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affect whether an innovation gains transaction in a crowded legal
marketplace. The reality of these idiosyncratic factors, we argue, means
that all-encompassing theories of contractual innovations will inevitably
fall short of achieving their goals.
A.

Generating Innovations

Contract scholars have long puzzled over why lawyers devote the
time and resources required to develop innovative contractual language
when they are limited in their ability to monetize these creations.113 A
lawyer’s inability to extract the full economic benefits of a contractual
innovation stems from his or her inability to assert property rights in new
and innovative contract language. The lack of intellectual property rights
for contractual language, in other words, leaves these innovators with few
options beyond charging a particular client for the time that it took to
create a contractual innovation in connection with a particular matter,
billed at their normal hourly rates.114 Needless to say, this incentive is
unlikely to lead to the creation of a mousetrap radically different than the
ones that came before.
In this section, we argue that the potential reputational gains that flow
from developing a successful contractual innovation may partially offset
the deterrent effect derived from the lack of intellectual property for these
innovations.115 As a prelude to making this argument, however, it is useful
to briefly explain why it is so difficult to obtain intellectual property
protection for contract language in the first place.

113. There are many other reasons—separate and apart from those relating to
intellectual property—why a lawyer may be reluctant to develop new and innovative
contract language. These reasons include but are not limited to the stickiness of default
rules, the clear meaning that existing contract language has attained over time, and the
network effects that accrue to innovations that have already been widely adopted. See
Contractual Innovation, supra note 43, at 138–40. We focus here on intellectual property
rights because that is the most frequently cited disincentive to contractual innovation.
114. See Davis, supra note 5, at 105 (“Inability to appropriate the benefits of
innovation, in contracting as well as other fields, is often seen as one of the leading
obstacles to profit-oriented innovation.”).
115. Intellectual property scholars have identified a number of “negative spaces”
where social norms have spurred creativity and innovation despite the absence of
intellectual property protections for the items created. See Stephanie Plamondon Bair &
Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Anti-Innovation Norms, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (2018);
see also Introduction to CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1–2 (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017); Kal
Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, When Are IP Rights Necessary?: Evidence from
Innovation in IP’s Negative Space, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 309, [PINCITE] (Ben Depoorter & Peter S. Menell eds.,
2019); Christopher Jon Sprigman, Conclusion: Some Positive Thoughts about IP’s
Negative Space, in CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 249 (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017).
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Typically, when one thinks of how the creator of a useful invention
can capture some of the economic benefits of that invention, one turns to
patent law. In the case of contractual innovations, however, such creations
are typically ineligible for patent protection (even as business methods).
In recent guidance, the United States Patent and Trademark Office took
the position that “commercial or legal interactions (including agreements
in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales
activities or behaviors; business relations)” are generally ineligible for
patent protection.116 As such, a potential innovator is unlikely to be able to
obtain patent protection for new and inventive contract language.117
One might also assume that contractual innovations, to the extent that
they are truly original works of authorship, could be protected as literary
works under copyright law. It would appear, however, that “courts seem
more willing to acknowledge the copyrightability of contracts in the
abstract than to find actionable infringement in specific cases.”118 While
original contractual language is theoretically eligible for protection under
copyright law (and there have been a few cases where an innovator
succeeded in a copyright infringement claim against a competitor who
copied the language) that protection will allow contractual innovators to
appropriate the economic benefits of their innovations only in those cases
where the contract that is the object of the infringement suit was
effectively drafted from scratch.119 Since such cases are rare, copyright
will typically provide little protection to contractual innovations.120

116. See Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52
(Jan. 7, 2019).
117. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Patent Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why Legal
Methods Cannot be Patented, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333, 336 (2007); see also Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1169,
1180–82 (2011).
118. Suchman, supra note 4, at 142.
119. See Davis, supra note 5, at 106 (“Contracts are protected by copyright as
‘original works of authorship,’ but only the most blatant and literal forms of copying violate
that copyright. Copyright in a document is not infringed by using similar language
embodying the same idea, much less by different language. It has also been held that the
specific language of a contract or a business form cannot be copyrighted where the use of
that language is essential to expressing a particular underlying idea.”); see also Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 292 (1985) (“The
limits of copyright law create an initial barrier to innovation by denying contractors
substantial property rights in their formulations.”).
120. Triantis, supra note 74, at 195 (“The specific language of a contract is likely to
be protected by the author’s copyright, if it is original. However, other expressions of the
same idea - whether a promise by a party or the condition under which it is enforceable are not covered by her copyright. In most cases, therefore, it would be relatively easy for
another party to reproduce the innovative contractual provision of the drafter without
running afoul of her copyright. Even specific, original language might lose its copyright if
it is judicially interpreted and becomes part of the common law.”).
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Nor does trade secret law offer much in the way of protection. Many
contracts are multilateral agreements that involve a number of parties.
Innovating lawyers are, moreover, producing new contract language for
clients to use out in the world. In light of these facts, trade secret law—
which requires reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy—likewise offers
little hope of incentivizing contractual innovations.121
Even in the rare cases where a contractual innovation may entitle the
creator to some enforceable intellectual property right, there are still
practical impediments to a contractual innovator wielding her intellectual
property right to extract economic value from the innovation. Most
notably, the vast majority of contracts in the world are not publicly
available. They largely reside out-of-sight in file drawers and on hard
drives, their existence and contents only known by the parties to the
agreement and the attorneys that helped them draft it. This state of affairs
presents a difficult enforcement challenge for the would-be licensors.
How can you know that someone is infringing on your intellectual
property when it is impossible to identify the infringing publication?
As a practical matter, therefore, there is generally no meaningful
intellectual property protection for most contractual innovations.122
Contract lawyers are notorious and incorrigible plagiarists. Any would-be
contractual innovator must assume that his innovation will be widely
copied. Which brings us back to the problem that has troubled scholars of
contractual innovation—in the absence of intellectual property protection
for contractual innovations, with contractual innovators unable to
economically benefit from their innovations in the way that an inventor
with a patent or an author with a copyright can, why do lawyers develop
innovative contractual language at all?
We argue that, at least in some cases, would-be innovators are
motivated by the prospect of reputational gain. Carolynn Levy, the
attorney who developed the SAFE for Y Combinator, has achieved a
degree of fame within the entrepreneurial community for her work. Martin
Lipton has achieved even greater renown as the inventor and champion of
121. Suchman, supra note 4, at 104–05 (“[C]ontracts operate essentially as
nonproprietary intellectual goods, without even the benefit of trade secrecy once they have
been shared with clients, transaction partners, or courts.”). In addition, trade secret law
does not provide the owner with a property right (that can be monetized through broad
licensing arrangements) in the way that patent and copyright law facilitate. See Goetz &
Scott, supra note 120, at 309 (“Trade secret rules offer no alternative protection for
innovative formulations, since it is the breach of confidence by unauthorized disclosure,
rather than infringement of a property right, which is the gravamen of trade secret
liability.”).
122. Suchman, supra note 4, at 104 (“[A] law firm might wish to prevent others from
pirating innovative financial instruments that it is offering for a fee to its clients. In practice,
however, although the creators of new contract designs may receive copyright and patent
protection under certain circumstances, these rights are only weakly established and rarely
enforced.”).
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the poison pill. This is not to say that a desire for reputational gain always
motivates potential innovators. Indeed, we suspect that—on the whole—
most lawyers develop new contract language to solve a problem, not to
become famous. Nevertheless, reputation is a variable that can help to
explain why contractual innovations come into existence despite the many
obstacles—including the lack of intellectual property protections—that
serve to discourage such innovations.
B.

Diffusion of Innovations

Another advantage to conceptualizing contracts as a form of swag is
that it can help to explain why certain contractual innovations spread in
the months and years after they are first created.123 The process of
contractual innovation occurs in two steps. First, a person—typically,
though not always, a lawyer—develops a genuinely new piece of contract
language or a distinctively different set of contractual provisions creating
a new form of agreement.124 Second, other lawyers learn about this new
language and choose to incorporate it into their own agreements or to
adopt the new form in their practices.125 When discussing the various
catalysts that drive the process of contractual innovation forward, it is
important to distinguish between step one—the creation of a new
innovation, discussed in the previous section—and step two—the spread
of that innovation to other contracts and contract users.
To illustrate the utility of this distinction, consider the example of the
golden parachute. A golden parachute is a contractual agreement by which
a company promises to give one of its employees—typically a top
executive—significant benefits in the event the company is acquired by
another person or entity.126 The first golden parachute was given to Charles
Tillinghast Jr. when he was hired as the CEO of Transworld Airlines
(“TWA”) in 1961.127 When he was offered the job, Tillinghast demanded
that a clause be added to his employment agreement requiring the
123. See ROGERS, supra note 12, at 39–101 (surveying the scholarly literature on the
diffusion of innovations across many different contexts).
124. Id. at 136.
125. Id. at 168.
126. See Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 955, 955 (1987) (“Golden parachutes are special compensation agreements that
provide guaranteed payments to corporate executives whose employment has been
terminated because of a change in control of their corporation.”).
127. See Claire Suddath, Biggest Golden Parachutes: Charles Tillinghast, Jr., TIME,
https://bit.ly/2lI6YhH (last visited Sept. 22, 2019). Although Tillinghast received what we
would now term a golden parachute, the term “golden parachute” was not coined until the
1980s. See Theodore A. Levine, Recent Developments in SEC Enforcement, 61 N.C. L.
REV. 463, 466 (1983) (marking the first time the term “golden parachute” appears to have
used in a law review article); see also Harry Anderson & Erik Ipsen, Perks for the Merged,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 7, 1981, at 65 (marking first time the term “golden parachute” appears
to have been used in popular press in English).
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company to pay him a sum of money if he was fired.128 He felt compelled
to ask for this provision because he was concerned that Howard Hughes—
the eccentric millionaire who owned a significant portion of the stock in
TWA—would regain control of the company that had recently been
wrested away from him and fire him.129 The TWA board acceded to his
request and the golden parachute was born.130
Over the next two decades, however, relatively few companies saw
fit to offer golden parachutes to their executives and relatively few
executives thought to ask for them. There just weren’t that many eccentric
millionaires threatening to take control of a company and oust incumbent
management. In the late 1970s, however, this began to change.131 As
companies began to become the targets of hostile takeover bids, their top
executives were thrust on the horns of a dilemma.132 As fiduciaries, the
executives had a legal obligation to support takeover bids that were in the
best interests of the shareholders.133 As employees, however, they were
reluctant to support bids that would lead to losing their jobs, as often
happened when companies were acquired.134 To address this conflict of
interest, companies began offering golden parachutes to executives to
align their interests with those of the shareholders. Yes, the executive
would likely lose his job if the takeover went through, but the existence of
the golden parachute meant that he would also receive a massive payout.135
As the 1980s wore on, golden parachutes were written into dozens—and
then hundreds—of employment contracts with executives across the
United States.136
128. Suddath, supra note 127-128.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Peer C. Fiss et al., How Golden Parachutes Unfolded: Diffusion and
Variation of a Controversial Practice, 23 ORG. SCI. 1077, 1078 (2012) (observing that the
golden parachute “emerged in the late 1970s among a handful of firms”).
132. Id.
133. See Bress, supra note 127, at 979 (“Golden parachutes can provide the premium
necessary to attract top managers to takeover-prone companies and may induce these
managers to act in the shareholders’ best interests, should a takeover commence.”).
134. Kenneth C. Johnsen, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule:
Toward a Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909, 914–18 (1985) (discussing
economic functions of golden parachutes).
135. After golden parachutes came into widespread use, commentators began to
worry that their true impact was to skew the incentives of the executives too far in the
opposite direction, such that they would approve takeovers that were not in the best
interests of the shareholders. See, e.g., Ann Marie Hanrahan, Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co.: The Wisconsin Supreme Court Addresses Executive Termination Benefits in
a Golden Parachute Contract, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 823, 831 (1987) (arguing that “visions
of a large cash pay-out upon merger might foreseeably preoccupy an executive with a
golden parachute because the covered executive would be more interested in receiving a
generous golden parachute than obtaining the best deal for the shareholders”).
136. See Fiss et al., supra note 132, at 1085 (tracking the spread of golden
parachutes).
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The catalyst that led to the creation of the first golden parachute was
the threat to a specific executive (Tillinghast) posed by a specific
shareholder (Hughes) at a specific company (TWA). The lawyers drafting
Tillinghast’s employment contract were not trying to change the world.
Rather, they were just trying to address a specific problem—the prospect
that Hughes might regain control of TWA—to persuade Tillinghast to take
the job. The catalyst driving the spread of this particular contractual
innovation was quite different. The hostile takeover boom that began in
the late 1970s forced companies to look for new ways to align the
incentives of top executives weighing hostile takeover bids with the
incentives of the shareholders. They soon realized that the golden
parachute had the potential to accomplish this goal and began to write such
clauses into an executive employment contract. The lawyers at TWA may
have created the pebble in 1961. However, it was the hostile takeover
boom that began in 1979 that sent that pebble cascading down the slope,
triggering an avalanche.
When interviewing lawyers who have developed successful
contractual innovations, the lawyers will rarely admit that they were
motivated by the prospect of reputational gain at the moment they created
the innovation. The lawyer will take credit, to be sure, but he will insist
that it was all done to benefit the client.137 The same cannot be said for
subsequent actions taken by the attorney to disseminate the innovation.
Making speeches and contributing papers to legal publications
encouraging others to adopt a particular contractual innovation will confer
few (if any) benefits upon the lawyer’s current clients. The widespread
dissemination of this contract language does, however, serve to enhance
the reputation of the lawyer who drafted that language. In order to tease
out the extent to which an innovator was motivated by the prospect of
reputational gain, therefore, one must look past the lawyer’s stated
intentions at the moment of creation to the innovator’s subsequent actions
to market and promote the contractual innovation. These are the actions
that most clearly bespeak a desire to lay claim to the reputational gains
that flow from a successful innovation.
Economists refer to such behavior as “free revealing.”138 Past
research has shown that this behavior is surprisingly common among
innovators outside of the business of law.139 Inventors will “spend

137. See Kaplinsky Interview, supra note 90.
138. ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 77 (2005) (defining “free
revealing” as an act where “all intellectual property rights to that information are
voluntarily given up by that innovator and all parties are given equal access to it—the
information becomes a public good”).
139. Id. at 78–80 (discussing examples of free revealing of innovations—though not
necessarily for reputational reasons—in industries as varied as steam engines,
semiconductor manufacture, sports equipment, and open source software).
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significant money and time to ensure that their innovations are seen in a
favorable light, and that information about them is effectively and widely
diffused.”140 Innovation scholars have hypothesized that there are
frequently private rewards to be obtained from free revealing.141 A chef
may conclude, for example, that the reputational gains to be realized from
revealing her recipes to the public may offset the reduction in profits from
the reveal.142 Similarly, a lawyer may decide that the reputational gains to
be realized from sharing innovative contract language with the world may
offset the costs developing that language in the first place. The logic of
free revealing is particularly appealing when there are network effects
associated with innovation. As Eric von Hippel argued:
[A]n innovation that is freely revealed and adopted by others can
become an informal standard that may preempt the development
and/or commercialization of other versions of the innovation. If . . . the
innovation that is revealed is designed in a way that is especially
appropriate to conditions unique to the innovator, this can result in
creating a permanent source of advantage for that innovator.143

The theory of free revealing provides a partial explanation as to why Y
Combinator was so willing to give away the SAFE. To the extent that that
document has now become an informal standard in the legal marketplace,
it offers lasting reputational gains to Y Combinator as the “inventor” of
this innovation. Wachtell and Lipton derived similar reputational gains
from their association with the poison pill, which explains why they
undertook such aggressive efforts to market that innovation in the years
after it was first developed.
One of the most telling signs that a lawyer-innovator is motivated, at
least in part, by the prospect of reputational gain in freely revealing
contract language is when that person attempts to “brand” the innovation
by giving it a catchy name. There is no need to brand an innovation
developed exclusively for the benefit of one’s clients.144 In assigning a
140. Id. at 85.
141. Id. at 86.
142. See Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual
Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 193 (2008) (“[A] chef can
use free revealing to raise his reputation with the general public and thus, for example,
increase his profit from selling cookbooks and/or from increased traffic to his restaurant.
Chefs often select their more important and interesting recipes to reveal in this public way,
reasoning that their reputation will be more effectively enhanced by revealing major rather
than minor innovations.”); id. at 196 (reporting that chefs were motivated to present their
recipes to the public at large, among other reasons, because doing so would (1) increase
their personal reputation, and (2) generate publicity for their restaurant); see also Robert
C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1983) (discussing firm
incentives to freely reveal innovations).
143. VON HIPPEL, supra note 139, at 86.
144. This does occasionally happen. The International Chamber of Commerce, for
example, has a registered trademark in the Incoterms that it promulgates for use in
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distinctive name to a particular innovation, however, the creator helps to
ensure that subsequent adopters of that innovation are able to trace it back
to the original source and recognize the brilliance of that particular
individual or organization.
In summary, the swag analogy highlights the role that reputation can
play in the dissemination of contractual innovations. Having developed a
contractual solution to a given problem, the innovator then takes the
necessary steps to ensure that word of the innovation spreads far and wide.
In cases where the innovation is branded—like the SAFE and the KISS or
the poison pill—it is easy for subsequent users to recognize the innovator.
In cases where the innovation is unbranded—like the class arbitration
waiver—then these subsequent users may still learn the identity of the
inventor if that person highlights the invention on his Wikipedia page and
on his firm website, for example. In other words, some contractual
innovations may spread because a person with a hand in creating them
takes steps to ensure that they spread. These steps are taken, in turn,
because the innovator wants to become known to all as the person that first
developed this particular bit of contract language.
C. The Virtues of Differentiation
It is easy to be seduced by a big idea. The possibility that there may
exist a single, all-encompassing theory that explains everything about a
particular phenomenon is tantalizing. In the existing literature on
contractual innovation, the big idea is a universal theory that explains the
process of contractual innovation. In this section, we express doubts as to
the viability of such a theory. While there may be theories capable of
offering a partial explanation of specific types of contractual innovation in
specific contexts, there are simply too many possible variables to predict
or explain the process of innovation taken as a whole. Our argument, in
other words, is that the limits inherent in the contract-as-swag analogy
highlight the limits in any general theory of contract innovation.
In this section, we first survey existing scholarly attempts to develop
a general theory of contractual innovation. We then identify several
weaknesses inherent in these efforts. First, we show that these theories are
highly context-specific. Theories that work well to explain changes in
sovereign bond contracts, for example, are ill-adapted to explain changes
in venture capital agreements. Second, we show that scholars often lack
sufficient knowledge to explain why a particular contractual innovation
caught on. Unlike superheroes, most contracts lack an origin story. Finally,
we show that the process of diffusion is often random. Contract language
international sales agreements. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 2010, at
125 (2010).), available at https://bit.ly/2sf7Ii5 (outlining the ICC Rules for the use of
domestic and international trade terms).
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will sometimes come to be the industry standard completely unbeknownst
to the individuals who first drafted it.
1.

Adapting Theories of Technological Innovation to
Contracts

Scholars have long attempted to develop a general theory of
contractual innovation by drawing upon the existing literature relating to
product innovation. Mark Suchman, for example, has suggested that the
process of contractual innovation occurs in four phases. In the first phase,
there is incremental change but contract language is largely
standardized.145 In the second phase, a technological discontinuity disrupts
and displaces previous practices and one begins to see linguistic
innovations in contract documents.146 In the third phase, there is a period
of fermentation.147 Some drafters start to boldly experiment with new
contract language; others seek to make incremental changes to the existing
language.148 In this phase, “different models (and their sponsors) compete
on the basis of economic performance, numerical prevalence, and
political/judicial endorsement.”149 Finally, in the fourth phase, a limited
number of dominant designs emerge as the industry standard and the
period of ferment comes to an end.150 This brings the innovation cycle to
a close, pending the next technological discontinuity, which then begins a
new cycle.
In outlining this theory, Suchman is as interested in the social
significance of the changes occurring at each of the four stages as he is in
the actual changes in contract language. In phase one, for example, he
hypothesizes that contracts are used for primarily symbolic purposes
because the language is largely standardized.151 By comparison, in phase
three, he hypothesizes that “the assumptions of a shared grammar” have
broken down and that the “transacting parties may find themselves forced
to rely on explicit contractual stipulations rather than taken-for-granted
relational scripts.”152 Suchman’s theory, therefore, is less a hypothesis
about how contract language changes over time than about the interplay
between contract language and the social context in which this language
is used in periods of technological change.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Suchman, supra note 4, at 133.
See id.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134.
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A different model of contractual innovation has been proposed by
Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner.153 This model, which is
similarly based on existing models relating to technological innovation,
posits that the process of contractual innovation proceeds in three stages.
At stage one, a particular standard form dominates the market. Stage one
comes to an end when an external shock disrupts the status quo.154 While
the precise nature of this shock is highly variable—it can be legal,
political, or economic—the shock serves as the catalyst for the process of
change and kicks off stage two.155 In stage two, marginal law firms begin
to experiment with contractual innovations that depart from the dominant
standard form. The effect of these actions is to reduce the dominance of
the existing standard form. In stage three, elite law firms and other market
leaders begin to promulgate their own innovations with the goal of
establishing a new standard.156 These innovations continue until practice
gradually coalesces around a single proposal. This innovation then
becomes the new standard form and the cycle begins again.
In contrast to Suchman, Choi et al. are more interested in the changes
to contract language over time than in the changing social context in which
that language is used. In addition, the model developed by Choi et al. was
developed specifically to explain changes to a specific provision (the pari
passu clause) in a specific type of contract (the sovereign debt agreement).
This context-specific limitation notwithstanding, other scholars have
looked to this model in an attempt to explain the general process of
contractual innovation with respect to contracts other than sovereign debt
agreements.157 We argue that this reliance may be misplaced for the
reasons outlined below.

153. Stephen Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
9–10 (2013) [hereinafter Dynamics of Contract]; see also Stephen Choi et al., The
Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 152 (2012).
154. See Dynamics of Contract, supra note 154, at 27 (“[S]hifts in boilerplate contract
terms do not occur without some initial shock.”).
155. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 247–48 (2013)
(describing shocks as “changes in legal interpretations of terms, or technological
advances”).
156. Dynamics of Contract, supra note 154, at 37 (“[T]op market participants switch
from being defenders of the status quo to promoters of their own individual visions of the
anticipated new standard.”).
157. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 104, at 982–83 (invoking shock model to
explain changes to arbitration clauses); see also David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke
Procedure, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 394 (2014) (“Contract terms do not evolve linearly
and progressively in rational counterpoint to slow changes in doctrine. They change
contingently, explosively, and at moments punctuated by shocks.”); Matthew Jennejohn,
The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71, 89 n.83 (2018) (suggesting
that “boilerplate evolves according to a punctuated equilibrium model of institutional
change, by which concentrated and often dramatic adjustments follow long stretches of
stasis”).
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2. The Problem of Complexity
The contract-as-swag analogy helps to make clear that the process of
contractual innovation is too varied, too complicated, and too random to
be explained by any single theory.158 It is indisputable that some contracts
are created and disseminated by actors who are seeking to enhance their
brand and improve their reputation. It is also indisputable that other
contracts are created and disseminated for reasons having nothing to do
with reputation. Reputation is, in other words, a variable that is only
intermittently relevant to the process of contractual innovation. This fact,
in turn, calls into question whether other factors may only be intermittently
relevant to the process by which contracts evolve and change.
There are at least five reasons to doubt the viability of a universal
theory of contractual innovations. First, the process of contractual
innovation will vary depending on the context. Contractual innovation in
a sovereign debt agreement, for example, will frequently proceed along
very different lines than the innovation of language in a real estate
agreement.159 The evolution of language in a contract drafted by an elite
law firm will play out differently than the evolution of language in a
contract drafted by a non-profit organization or a solo practitioner.160 The
process by which substantive commercial terms at the front of the contract
evolve is likely to be different than the process by which boilerplate terms

158. The general model promulgated by Choi, Gulati, and Posner, for example, seems
to presuppose that all contracts are both products and commodities that are produced in
mass quantities. The model further presupposes that all contracts are bought and sold in a
marketplace. While these suppositions may be warranted when dealing with a sovereign
debt agreement—which, to be fair, was the type of agreement that they were focused on
when writing the paper—it is far from clear that they are warranted when dealing with
other types of contracts.
159. To illustrate this point, compare the evolution of language in sovereign debt
agreements with the stubborn persistence of dollarization in Israeli real estate contracts. In
the 2000s, several U.S. courts interpreted the pari passu clause in certain sovereign debt
agreements in a manner that required the sovereign to repay certain creditors in full before
it made payments to anybody else. See Mark Weidemaier et al., Origin Myths, Contracts,
and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 72, 95–96 (2013). These decisions
notwithstanding, the elite lawyers tasked with drafting these agreements did not make any
changes to the clause to correct what they generally viewed as a flawed interpretation.
Change only came after the Federal Reserve convened a conference attended by
representatives of several elite law firms. See id. By way of comparison, consider Israeli
real estate contracts. These contracts had historically been denominated by U.S. dollars
rather than Israeli shekels due to fears about hyperinflation.See Doron Teichman, Old
Habits Are Hard to Change: A Case Study of Israeli Real Estate Contracts, 44 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 299, 309 (2010). In the wake of the U.S. financial crisis beginning in 2008,
however, there was a dramatic shift in favor of shekels such that virtually all such contracts
were being denominated in shekels by May 2008. See id. The language in the sovereign
debt contracts changed in response to a series of judicial decisions and the intervention by
a federal regulator. The Israeli real estate contracts changed in response to concerns about
a weakened dollar in the wake of the financial crisis.
160. See Davis, supra note 5, at 116–21.
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at the back of the contract evolve.161 It is exceedingly difficult to imagine
a single theory capable of capturing the dynamics underlying the process
of innovation in each of these disparate instances.162
Second, many of the generalist models posit that the process of
contractual innovation will be triggered by some sort of “discontinuity” or
“shock.” This observation is sensible—it is rare that someone wakes up in
the morning and suddenly decides to update their contract language—but
the triggering event could be almost anything. A financial crisis may
prompt a law firm to revise its standard “material adverse effect” clause.163
A conference presentation by one attorney may prompt another to update
his choice-of-law clause.164 An internal company policy may call for
reevaluating all contract language every ten years.165 The statutory
codification of a rule of customary international law may enhance the
salience of that rule to the point where lawyers can no longer realistically
ignore that rule in their contracts.166 A well-publicized lawsuit may lead to

161. See John F. Coyle, The Role of the CISG in U.S. Contract Practice: An Empirical
Study, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 195, 237 (2016) (quoting in-house lawyer as stating that “[i]n
the ordinary course of commerce, where there are lots of contracts flying around all the
time, and time/cost are always issues, it is not uncommon to agree to a choice of law
without doing a detailed analysis of how that jurisdiction’s laws work for you or against
you”).
162. There are also some contracts that seem to evolve on a near-constant basis. See
Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 41
IOWA J. CORP. L. 393, 414–15 (2015) (“While commentators frequently note the lack of
innovation in many legal documents, leveraged-loan transactions provide an impressive
counterexample. In the course of less than a decade, dozens of new provisions were
developed that, over time, became standard loan terms.”); see also Elisabeth de Fontenay,
Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan Market, 39 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 725 (2014) (documenting numerous changes in loan documents).
163. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract Design:
Variations in Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 52–57 (2013) (noting changes in
material adverse change clauses before and after financial crisis).
164. One of us (Coyle) has given numerous presentations to law firms in North
Carolina on how to draft choice-of-law clauses and forum selection clauses. Dozens of
lawyers have reported to him that they revised the language in their standard forms after
attending one of these presentations.
165. The International Chamber of Commerce is the keeper of a set of contract
definitions known as “Incoterms.” See Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Incoterms Rules
(2010), https://iccwbo.org/resources-for-business/incoterms-rules/incoterms-rules-2010/.
These contract terms are routinely incorporated into contracts for the purchase and sale of
goods and function to allocate risks between the buyer and the seller. The Incoterms used
to be updated on an as-needed basis, but they are now updated every ten years. See id.
Since the Incoterms are non-state law—they are effective only when expressly
incorporated into the contract—the effect of these updates is roughly analogous to a
software company pushing out a patch for its software every ten years.
166. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL.
L. REV. 67, 111 (2014) (arguing that the “post-[Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act]
contract shift was a formal, largely symbolic, reaction to a development that increased the
salience of legal enforcement for the bankers and lawyers who bear primary responsibility
for structuring sovereign bond issues and thinking about the consequences of default”); see
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industry-wide revisions to a particular contract provision.167 Lawyers
eager to make it appear as though they are providing value to their clients
may engage in mindless editorial churning that introduces many changes
to particular types of agreement.168 There are so many possible events that
can generate new contract language that one hesitates to call them
“shocks” or “discontinuities” because they are not all that infrequent. One
person’s shock, moreover, may be another person’s continuity. One can
easily imagine a scenario in which two attorneys attend the exact same
conference presentation but where only one revises her contract language
when she gets back to the office.169
Third, the process of dissemination is highly variable.170 Some
innovations spread through word-of-mouth. Others spread because they
appear on a particular blog. Others spread because a single actor with
many thousands of counterparties changes its standard form agreement.171
Others spread because a law professor publishes a paper. Others spread
because the contract innovator wants to make a name for himself and
attract new clients. Still others spread because the New York Fed hosts a
conference.172 How can one single theory possibly account for all of these
possible distribution networks at a level of specificity that would
meaningfully contribute to our knowledge of contractual innovation?

also W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, The Relevance of Law to Sovereign Debt, 11
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 395, 399 (2015).
167. See William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 1597, 1657 (2018) (discussing how the Marblegate decision rendered by the
Southern District of New York led some drafters to revise their bond indentures).
168. See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger
Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 61 (2017) (“This study shows that a high level of
‘editorial churning’—unnecessary and ad hoc edits that appear to be cosmetic rather than
substantive—takes place in legal drafting. This churning appears to go far beyond the
necessary deal-specific edits, with over half of merger agreement text being routinely
rewritten even though the substantive provisions of merger agreements have similar
features.”).
169. In giving presentations about choice-of-law clauses and forum selection clauses
at North Carolina law firms, one of us (Coyle) has also been told that lawyers who attended
the presentation made absolutely no changes to their form documents. See supra note 165
and accompanying text.
170. ROGERS, supra note 12, at 169 (“[A]n individual’s decision about an innovation
is not an instantaneous act. Rather, it is a process that occurs over time and consists of a
series of different actions.”).
171. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 241 (2013);
see also Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for
Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 311 (2009);
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The
Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 450 (2008).
172. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (explaining that provision in
sovereign debt contracts only changed after the Federal Reserve hosted a conference
attended by representatives of elite New York law firms).
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Fourth, most contractual innovation occurs behind closed doors.
Scholars can observe only a very small fraction of all contracts. Like the
proverbial man looking for his car keys beneath the streetlight, we write
only about the things that we can see. In many cases, scholars will not
know precisely why the language in a given contract was changed because
there will be no way to identify the person who made the change.173
Indeed, in many cases scholars will not even know that the language in a
given contract changed because that agreement and all of its predecessors
are stored in a locked file cabinet. In such cases, it is difficult to know
much of anything about the process of contractual innovation.
Fifth, and finally, even in cases where it is possible to identify the
pebble that starts the avalanche, it is not always clear that the innovator
was actively seeking this result. Consider the example of the forum
selection bylaw, a provision that a company writes into its bylaws
stipulating that any and all shareholder litigation relating to the internal
affairs of the company must proceed in a particular forum.174 The first
known example of such a bylaw appeared in 1991.175 Other companies
adopted a forum selection bylaw in 1992, 1994, and 2006. And yet, each
of these innovations led to an evolutionary dead-end—no other companies
ever copied the language for use in their own bylaws.
In 2007, a specific version of the forum selection bylaw began to gain
traction. This version first appeared in an IPO by a company called
Netsuite and was drafted by Joseph Grundfest (a professor at Stanford Law
School) in collaboration with lawyers at Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich and
Rosati P.C. The language used in this provision was subsequently
replicated—with only minor variations—in 102 of the 111 bylaws (91.8%)
adopted by public companies over the next four years.
Significantly, the rapid diffusion of this particular contract language
came as a complete surprise to the individuals who drafted it. In 2012,
Joseph Grundfest wrote that this particular forum selection bylaw
appears inadvertently to have become the standard form of forum
selection language that today dominates the market for intra-corporate
forum selection provisions. I say “inadvertently” because none of the
framers of that forum selection language consciously anticipated that

173. See, e.g., John F. Coyle, A Short History of the Choice-of-Law Clause, 91 COLO.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)), available at https://bit.ly/2Q3s4Uq (discussing challenges of
tracking changes to language in choice-of-law clauses over time).
174. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2019) (authorizing use of forum selection
bylaws); see also Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 950–
52 (Del. Ch. 2013) (upholding validity of forum selection bylaws).
175. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum
Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 352 (2012).
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it would become the dominant form of forum selection provision to
appear in the organic documents of publicly traded corporations.176

Indeed, the lawyers at Wilson Sonsini did not even include a forum
selection bylaw in the next twelve IPOs they did post-Netsuite.177 This fact
tends to confirm Grundfest’s assertion that neither he nor they fully
appreciated the significance of the language they had drafted for Netsuite.
These lawyers were not seeking to enhance their reputation when they
developed this innovation and yet, somehow, the innovation had a lasting
impact on this area of the law. While they may have knocked loose the
pebble that started the avalanche, they had no idea that was what they were
doing. The prospect for reputational gain does not appear to have played
any role in their thinking.
In summary, the contract-as-swag analogy does not purport to be an
all-encompassing theory of contractual innovation. It offers a partial
explanation as to why some contractual innovations occur under some
circumstances. Some readers may find the modesty of this claim to be
unappealing. They are looking for the next big idea. However, we believe
that grand theories that purport to provide complete explanations as to why
all contractual innovations occur under all circumstances are unrealistic.
The world of contractual innovation is so complex, and the range of
catalysts that can spark change is so varied, that no one theory can explain
it all.
V.

CONCLUSION

One must always be careful when dealing with metaphors. “Half the
wrong conclusions at which mankind arrive,” said Palmerston, “are
reached by the abuse of metaphors, and by mistaking general resemblance
or imaginary similarity for real identity.”178 At the same time, the best
metaphors possess an “almost magical capacity to unleash creative
thought.”179 Over the past several decades, scholars from many different
academic traditions have turned to metaphor in an attempt to better explain
the nature of the contract. They have analogized the contract to a product,
a social artifact, and a form of technology. Each of these metaphors is
useful in its own way. And yet, none of them fully captures the incentives
that lead lawyers to develop and to disseminate new contract language.
The contract-as-swag metaphor accounts for these incentives. Every
lawyer in the United States has encountered tote bags and water bottles
176. Id.
177. See Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to
Multiforum Shareholder Litigation 35–36 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 21362, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21362.
178. PHILIP GUEDELLA, PALMERSTON 182 (Hodder & Stoughton 1950) (1926).
179. See Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J.
395, 414 (1986).
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emblazoned with the names of law firms. While it may seem odd to
connect this swag with legal agreements, many agreements are given away
for the same reasons that a law firm gives away branded flash drives (i.e.,
to attract prospective customers, increase brand awareness, enhance
reputation, and promote goodwill). This realization, in turn, yields several
important insights. It shows that the prospect of reputational gain can
sometimes lead to the development of new contract language or (more
commonly) to the dissemination of that new contract language to other
contract users. It also calls into question whether it is possible to develop
a universal theory of contractual innovation.

